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I 1993 American political scientist Samuel Huntington published his famous article on 
‘The clash of civilizations?’ in which he insisted that the most serious conflicts in the coming 
era will be between groups that are radically different from each other in terms of language, 
religion and culture (Huntington 1993). One might say Huntington was rather unfortunate 
with the timing as the next major conflict, reaching genocidal proportions, took place in 
Rwanda one year later between two groups that were generally regarded as extremely similar. 
The Hutu and the Tutsi are both Christian peoples, speak the same language and had lived 
intermingled for centuries in the same country. They intermarried and shared the same social 
and political culture. The main differences between them were their body height and 
traditional economy – agriculture vs. livestock breeding. Based on these differences their 
colonial masters in the early 20th century separated them into two distinct ethnic groups 
(Gourevitch 1998: 47-55; Mann 2005: 432-34), but often it was impossible to tell a Hutu from 
a Tutsi by their appearance, you had to know who was what. 
If Huntington’s theory was wrong, perhaps the opposite claim is correct? In other words, 
a high degree of similarities between two groups predisposes them for conflict? For instance, 
the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia -- the most massive killings in Europe since 
World War II -- pitted against each other peoples that shared a lot of common cultural traits 
(Wachtel 1998). To be sure, Samuel Huntington would interpret this as a case of civilizational 
clash since the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosnians adhere to three different religions. Indeed 
they do, but this fact can easily be misinterpreted. In the communist period, Yugoslavia had 
undergone considerable secularization, and for most Yugoslavs religious affiliation did not 
indicate which house of worship they themselves went to, but rather which religion their 
parents or grandparents had practiced. Moreover, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians spoke the 
same language, looked alike, dressed alike, watched the same movies, listened to the same 
music, and basically ate the same food. To be sure, some dishes were regarded as 
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‘traditionally Bosnian’ or ‘typically Serbian’, but members of all groups could well relish the 
food of all the other nations.  
If one starts to look for cases of genocide and other forms of extreme violence involving 
groups with virtually the same cultural background, phenotypical similarities, and identical 
language, it is surprising how much one can come up with. Let me remind you of just a few. It 
has often been commented that Somalia is one of the few -- if not the only -- African country 
whose population is monoethnic, but this did not prevent it from descending into an inferno of 
internecine killings in the 1990s. Furthermore, no-one would characterize the civil wars in 
Zaire/Congo in the 1990s – involving millions of deaths – as a case of civilizational clash. 
There were no doubt tribal differences among the warring parties in the Congolese wars, but 
these differences did not straddle any racial or religious barrier. In the hideous Cambodian 
genocide -- one of the worst in recent memory -- Cambodians killed Cambodians in what has 
been characterized as an ‘auto-genocide’ (Charot, 2002)  
In fact, one might include even the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jewish race on this 
list of genocides where the victims were very similar to the perpetrators. To be sure, the 
Holocaust involved a clear-cut case of religious differences – Gentiles vs. Jews and most of 
the East European Jews exterminated by the Nazis had a lifestyle and culture very different 
from their executioners. Even so, it was the Nazis’ encounter with highly urbanized and 
assimilated Jews in Germany and Austria that imbued them with their determination to kill as 
many Jews as possible. These German-speaking Jews often went to extreme lengths to adopt 
to the cultural practices of their ‘indigenous’ German neighbors. Many even brought a pine 
tree adorned with candle lights and colored glass balls into their living rooms during 
Hanukkah, or ‘Weihnukkah’, as it was sometimes derisively called. Moreover, their German 
was so impeccable that, as was the case with the Hutus and the Tutsis, it would have been 
impossible to use ‘the Shibboleth criterion’ to distinguish them from their German 
neighbours.1 They would love Goethe and Schiller just as much as they loved Heine, and 
probably prefer Beethoven to Mendelssohn.  
Can we from these observations extract a general theory of cultural closeness leading to 
hostility and conflict between similar groups? Intrigued by this question I started to look for 
                                                 
1 In the Book of Judges there is a story about how the Hebrews of the Old Testament fought against a 
neighboring people, the Ephraimites. The Ephraimites lost, and many of them tried to escape from the 
battle by pretending to be a Jew. When captured, the fugitives were exposed by a simple phonetic test: 
if they were unable to pronounce the Jewish word ‘Shibboleth’ (saying ‘Sibboleth’ instead) they had 
revealed that they were not a Jew. Forty-two thousand Ephraimites failed the test and were killed 
(Judges, 12:5-6). 
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traces of such theories and came across the concept of ‘narcissism of minor differences’ (or 
NMD for short). As one might expect, it emanates from the writings of Sigmund Freud who 
returned to it on three different occasions, each time adding a new dimension to it. The 
concept originally stemmed from his observations of clients during psychotherapy, and hence 
referred to individual psychological disorder. Later Freud employed it also in his cultural 
analysis of European civilization and applied it to relations between ethnic and national 
groups.  
According to Alvin Burstein the paradoxical claim that internecine conflict is especially 
related to small differences is not only broadly accepted, but often presented as an 
indisputable given. (Burstein 1999: 1) Some scholars who refer to the ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’-concept do so without further commentary as if the term were self-explanatory 
(and sometimes use it quite out of context, see e.g. Horowitz and Matthews 1997). A few 
authors, however, have discussed the concept in some depth, and some make rather strong 
assertions on behalf of it. David Werman (1998: 457) for instance, claims that ‘the narcissism 
of minor differences has a malignant potential to erupt in vast bloodbaths which have even 
reached the level of genocide’. Watts (2001: 90) maintains that ‘the narcissistic construal of 
minor as major […] is so often attached to what one might call a “drive to extinction” by a 
compelling need to eliminate and extinguish the other’. Watts uses this theory to explain 
excessive state reactions to local conflicts in Nigeria. More articles that employ this theory 
will be presented below. But let us first turn to the origin of the concept and see what Freud 
himself had to say on the matter.  
 
Freud’ concept of narcissism of minor difference 
In Greek mythology, as will be recalled, Narcissus was a vain and beautiful hero whom the 
goddess Nemesis condemned to fall in love with his own image as reflected in a pond. Freud 
therefore used the term ‘narcissism’ as an expression of morbid self-love. By ‘Narcissism of 
minor difference’¸ then, Freud originally meant a special kind a morbid self-love that builds 
upon an exaggerated notion of how the person differs from people around him/her. When he 
applied it also to relations among groups, the term suggested that group members embrace 
their group with an excessive love because they see it as radically different from other groups, 
a claim that an outside observer would regard as spurious. 
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Freud first used the term ‘narcissism of minor difference’ in The Taboo of Virginity 
(1917). Here he built on an idea he allegedly had found in the writings of the British 
anthropologist Ernest Crawley: 
 
Crawley, in language which differs only slightly from the current terminology of 
psycho-analysis, declares that each individual is separated from others by a ‘taboo of 
personal isolation’, and that it is precisely the minor differences in people who are 
otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them. 
It would be tempting to pursue this idea and to derive from this 'narcissism of minor 
differences' the hostility which in every human relationship we see fighting successfully 
against feelings of fellowship and overpowering the commandment that all men should 
love one another.(Freud 1917:199) 
 
Burstein (1999:2) points out that Freud misquoted Crawley who had maintained that not 
only minor differences but all differences are problematic. In order to find the roots of the 
NMD idea, therefore, we don’t have to go back to Crawley, but may stop at Freud. 
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) Freud developed this concept 
somewhat further and applied it to attitudes between nations and between regional groups 
within nations. ‘Closely related races keep one another at arm’s length; the South German can 
not endure the North German, the Englishman casts every kind of aspersion on the Scot, the 
Spaniard despises the Portuguese.’ However, in this book Freud did not claim that minor 
differences are more prone to lead to animosity and conflict than big ones. On the contrary, he 
immediately went on to suggest that greater differences may cause even greater hostility 
among groups: ‘We are no longer astonished that greater differences should lead to almost 
insuperable repugnance, such as the Gallic people feel for the German, the Aryan for the 
Semite, and the white races for the colored.’ (Freud 1921: 101) 
The third and last time Freud referred to the term ‘narcissism of minor difference’ is in 
his controversial but highly influential book Civilization and its Discontents. Here he stated 
that  
 
It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so 
long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their 
aggressiveness. I once discussed the phenomenon that it is precisely communities with 
adjoining territories, and related to each other as well, that are engaged in constant feuds 
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and in ridiculing each other—like the Spaniards and the Portuguese, for instance, the 
North Germans and the South Germans, the English and the Scots and so on. I gave this 
phenomenon the name of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ a name that does not do 
much to explain it. We can now see that it is a convenient and relatively harmless 
satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between the 
members of the community is made easier. (Freud 1930: 114)  
 
Here Freud clearly shows the main sociological function of NMD as he sees it: it 
increases cohesion within the group by directing aggression towards outsiders.  
Civilization and its Discontents is based on a most pessimistic perception of human 
nature. Man is inherently an asocial and aggressive animal, and the purpose of civilization (or 
‘Kultur’ as Freud called it in German) is to tame our aggressive inclinations and enable us to 
‘live and let live’ rather than annihilate each other. The instinct of aggression cannot be 
entirely extinguished, but the remnants of it that civilization is unable to suppress, may be 
directed towards human beings beyond the pale. In that way aggression is prevented from 
tearing the group apart. As an example of how this is done, Freud sardonically remarked that 
the Jews throughout history ‘have rendered most useful services to the civilizations of the 
countries that have been their hosts’ (ibid.). 
The above quotations represents the entire corpus of Freud’s writings on NMD. The idea 
was never developed into a full-fledged theory, but remained a few scattered and isolated 
remarks that left a number of questions unanswered. For instance, on what level in Freud’s 
three-storey structure of man’s psyche did he believe that these socio-psychological processes 
take place: on the level of the subconscious, the consciousness, or in the super-ego? And just 
as importantly, did he believe that minor differences are able to cause animosity and conflicts, 
or is it only a case of ex post rationalization of hostility that exists prior to and independent of 
differences between individuals and groups? Werman (1988: 452) believes that latter, but how 
should we then interpret Freud’s remark that ‘We are no longer astonished that greater 
differences should lead to almost insuperable repugnance’ (emphasis added)? And finally, if 
Freud believed that both big and small differences are related to group formation, wherein lies 
the specificity of the ‘narcissism of minor differences’? 
Civilization and its Discontents was written only three years before Hitler’s rise to 
power and eight years before Freud had to flee from Germany. To the extent that Freud really 
saw NMD -- including the Europeans’ treatment of the Jews -- as a ‘relatively harmless 
satisfaction of the inclination to aggression’, we might be allowed to see the publication of his 
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book as just as badly timed as Huntington’s article. Be that as it may, most later 
commentators seem to assume that Freud had stumbled across a socio-psychological 
mechanism that was more powerful than he himself suspected.  
 
Modern usages of the NMD idea  
Those who have written about NMD fall roughly into two professional categories: 
psychoanalysts and social scientists. The contributions of the first group dominated until 
around 1990-92, that is, until the outbreak of the wars of Yugoslav succession, when 
sociologists, social anthropologists, and political scientists took over. With their intimate 
knowledge of Freudianism the psychoanalysts will presumably be best placed to give a 
correct exegesis of the Freudian scriptures, while the social scientists might have a better 
insight into the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. Ideally, they may complement each other.  
Psychiatrist David Werman notes that practitioners of psychoanalysis have paid 
relatively little attention to the notion of NMD, in spite of the fact that this phenomenon, he 
claims, may be observed almost daily in all walks of life. As an example he mentions an 
episode from his own practice as a psychoanalyst. A middle-aged professor of the humanities 
entered psychoanalysis due to, inter alia, difficulties in relations with his colleagues. ‘Dr. M 
described a heated discussion he had had with one of his colleagues. It was evident that the 
initial disagreement was not of great importance, but … Dr. M. was not in the least aware of 
the triviality of the original argument.’ (Werman, 1998: 456) Werman concluded that the 
patient suffered from a narcissism of minor differences.  
One can easily sympathize with the doctor’s frustration as he had to listen to his 
patience’s outpourings and lack of understanding as to what are the really important issues in 
life. However, most of us will also no doubt have experienced this situation from the patient’s 
side, for instance when we are trying to explain the importance of our research to an outsider. 
Sometimes we may be driven to the point of desperation when a layman not only fails to 
understand the significance of our great scientific undertaking, but even begins to question 
why society should provide financial support to research that, he alleges, has no relevance for 
‘the real life’. The point to be made here, then, is simply that what is major and what is minor 
depends entirely on the perspective, close up or far away. Surprisingly few who have written 
on NMD seem to have taken on board this elementary insight, most treat ‘minor’ and ‘major’ 
as absolutes. In the body of literature examined in this article only one author (Michael 
Ignatieff, see below) acknowledges the relativity of these qualities.  
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A second psychoanalyst, Vamik Volkan (1986), links Freud’s concept of NMD to the 
psychoanalytical theory of externalization, that is, the unconscious defense mechanism by 
which individuals project their own internal characteristics, particularly the bad ones, onto the 
outside world and onto other people. When they later come across a person with these 
characteristics, they no longer recognize them as their own. According to Volkan, such 
externalizations help a child attain a more cohesive self-representation and more consistent 
internalized object representation. ‘When kept inside, unmended bad units threaten the 
integrity of the self, but when put “out there” at a safe distance, and when used for 
comparison with the good units kept inside, they enhance the sense of the self. Such “bad” 
suitable targets contain the precursors of the concept of an enemy shared by the group’. 
(Volkan, 1986: 185; emphasis in the original).  
To illustrate this theory, Volkan refers to the conflict between Greeks and Turks on 
Cyprus. Greeks and Turks can distinguish each other at a glance just by noticing such 
seemingly insignificant details as different brands of cigarettes: Greeks usually prefer to 
smoke cigarettes in blue and white packages – the Greek national colors – while the Turks 
smoke cigarettes with their national colors – red and white. While this observation is 
somewhat amusing, it seems to me highly doubtful that such code signaling is what Freud had 
in mind when he wrote about NMD. These colors codes do not in any way constitute the basis 
for the identity difference between Greeks and Turks but is only a short-hand way of 
expressing it. It is no doubt true that the two island groups have a lot of traditions and customs 
in common, shared features that sometimes also differentiate them from their coethnics on the 
mainland. At the same time, there are plenty easily observable differences between Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots with regard to language and religion, as well as to various 
cultural codes and culinary traditions related to religion (Yagcioglu 1996). Therefore, the 
islanders do not really have to take resort to cigarette brands to tell each other apart. We 
should not confuse ‘minor cultural differences’ with consciously constructed symbols.  
If we then move on to the contributions of social scientists to the NMD debate, we first 
encounter an article by Turkish political scientist Türkkaya Ataöv (1998). In a rebuttal to 
Samuel Huntington Ataöv points out that in today’s world there are as many, if not more 
conflicts within civilizations as there are conflicts between them, for instance in Northern 
Ireland, Rwanda, and Pakistan. Ataöv also notes that ‘the peoples of the newly independent 
republics of former Soviet Central Asia are largely Muslim and Turkic. Nevertheless, there 
are conflicts among them due to minor differences’ (Ataöv 1998: 5). This is a strong version 
of the NMD thesis: here Ataöv is saying that the conflicts in Central Asia have arisen not only 
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in spite of the similarity between the groups, but due to the minor differences between them. 
However, as he develops his thesis further, he reverses the causal order between conflict and 
difference:  
 
The interaction of neighbors may be good example. When relations are pleasant, their 
desirable parts come to the fore. When disagreements rise, differences get the upper 
hand, and minor differences are then magnified. Even if there are no minor differences, 
groups tend to create them. (ibid) 
 
In this example it is clear that the hostility did not stem from the minor differences, 
instead, the conflicts are caused by something else. Members of different groups seize upon 
the minor differences in order to expand the identity gap between them and justify their 
mutual hostility. The minor differences, then, enter the picture as ex post rationalizations and 
not as original impetus. If the differences between the groups had been major rather than 
minor they would no doubt have served the purpose equally well. Ataöv’s argument leaves 
the crucial question unanswered: if conflicts do not stem from (cultural) differences after all, 
what are they then caused by?  
The theoretically most ambitious attempt to elaborate on and expand Freud’s NMD 
notion into a full-fledged theory of conflict has been undertaken by Dutch anthropologist 
Anton Blok (1998). Blok makes a double claim: first, minor cultural differences are more 
important than major ones. Civil wars, for instance in Russia and the United States, are 
usually described as more merciless than other wars. The conflicts in post-Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda are cited as other examples. Second, not only do minor differences underlie a wide 
range of conflicts, but also the opposite is true: hierarchy and great differences make for 
relative stability and peace.  
Blok, in a sense, is more Freudian than Freud himself. He believes that when Freud 
wrote that ‘We are no longer astonished that greater differences should lead to almost 
insuperable repugnance’, the great Austrian doctor came very close to undermining his own 
theory. This sentence, Blok thinks, shows that Freud failed to recognize the importance of his 
own discovery and reduced its heuristic value (Blok 1998: 35). Blok even suggests that Freud 
may have misunderstood the quintessence of his own discovery, and he volunteers to rectify 
this by revealing its true purport. 
As it turns out, however, many of the examples Blok cites clearly show that other 
factors than NMD, such as status anxiety, economic interests, and competition for material 
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resources play a greater role in conflicts than he himself is willing to admit. For instance, he 
refers to the Burakumin in Japan, a socially discriminated group that has sometimes been 
compared to the untouchables in India. The Burakumin are ethnically, physiologically, and 
linguistically indistinguishable from other Japanese but have historically been treated as 
secondary citizens, or worse. They were confined to the most contemptible professions – 
butchering and leatherwork – and had to live in separate quarters. This indeed seems to be a 
clear-cut case of social differentiation based on marginal distinctions. The Burakumin were 
officially emancipated in 1871 but this did not change the negative attitudes towards them. On 
the contrary, ‘local farmers persecuted the Burakumin for fear of being reduced to the status 
of these former outcasts’ (Blok 1998: 40). Status anxiety, then, is the crux of the matter.  
A similar case, also cited by Blok, is anti-Black racism in the American South after the 
abolition. The most severe persecution, Blok points out, came ‘from poor and lower middle 
class whites…(who) feared being put on par with the former slaves.’ (ibid.) Again we see that 
status anxiety and fear of economic competition are the decisive factors rather than cultural 
distance per se. In any case, the phenotypical differences between poor Whites and poor 
Blacks in the United States are so evident that it is highly questionable whether this 
distinction may be regarded as ‘minor’. 
Blok concludes, quite sensibly, that ‘the narcissism of minor differences does not 
automatically result in violence.’(Blok 1998: 49). In addition to demographic and ecological 
conditions, which Blok admits will often be very important, he points to the political context 
as a critical factor. ‘In all cases where a loss of differences resulted in extreme violence we 
find unstable states.’ While Blok, as we saw, faulted Freud for having emasculated his own 
idea, he himself towards the end of his article makes considerably more modest claims on 
behalf of NMD than the assertions he started out with. 
In an interesting article from 2005 Brett St Louis makes some of the same observations 
as Blok: status anxiety and fear of economic competition are crucially important when minor 
differences are socially and politically activated. St Louis discusses conflicts within the Black 
population in the United States between ‘native-borns’ and ‘foreign-borns’. She starts by 
relating a minor episode from New York in 2004 when an Ethiopian immigrant was told that 
he could not benefit from a public health project to educate African Americans on prostate 
cancer. The project was part of an Affirmative Action program in which the concept of 
‘African Americans’ was understood to mean ‘descendants of Black slaves’ only. The 
Ethiopian immigrant therefore did not qualify. That made him wonder: if he was not an 
African American, what was he then? 
 9
As it turns out, around 2 million Blacks in the United States are foreign-born, and 
together they make up around 5 percent of the total Black population in the country. In New 
York city, they constituted in 2000 no less than 30 percent. It may seem strange that these 
immigrants do not identify with native-born Blacks, but in fact many of them do not. Several 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain why this is the case. Black novelist Toni 
Morrison has argued that they prefer not to identify racially because they quickly realize that 
in the USA blackness is firmly positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy (St Louis 
2005: 349). But, as the Ethiopian experienced, dissociation is strong in the other direction, 
too. Those African immigrants that might want to embrace blackness have no guarantee that 
they will be accepted.  
As seen from a non-Black perspective, at least, the squabbles among American Blacks 
might seem like a textbook case of identity differentiation based on very minor distinctions. 
Brett St Louis believes that Freud’s notion of NMD ‘provides a useful framework for 
understanding the qualitative aspects of this tension between racial sameness and 
ethnonational difference’ (St Louis 2005: 347). In her own approach, however, she relies 
heavily on an analysis of socio-economic competition between these groups that owes little to 
Freud’s original idea. The most important explanation for this conflict, as St Louis sees it, is 
the fear among native-born Blacks that the immigrants may eclipse them socially and on the 
labor market. In the American Black community there is a widespread perception that the 
immigrants are aggressive competitors for social resources and opportunities. Statistical data 
show that foreign-born and native-born Blacks in the USA have very similar income levels, 
but due to the greater competitiveness and ambitions of the immigrants this may well change. 
It has for instance been pointed out that two thirds of the Black students at Harvard are either 
African or Caribbean immigrants or children of African or Caribbean immigrants. Brett St 
Louis, then, concludes that ‘for an analysis of narcissism and differentiation, it is important to 
address various motivations such as fear, failure, defensiveness, protection and affirmation, as 
well as material and symbolic processes.’ (St Louis 2005: 348) 
The author who has done most to familiarize a modern audience with the concept of 
NMD is no doubt Canadian journalist and war correspondent Michael Ignatieff. Ignatieff has 
also provided what in my view amounts to the most sober and balanced assessment of Freud’s 
notion. He has, however, presented his ideas in two different versions, a longer and a shorter 
one (Ignatieff 1998 and Ignatieff 1999). The former contains a number of caveats and nuances 
that are missing in the latter. This longer version is in many ways more defensible because it 
tries to defend far less.  
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An experience four o’clock in the morning in a Serbian command post in Eastern 
Slavonia in the Serbian-Croatian war in 1993 prompted Ignatieff to explore the Freudian 
concept of NMD. He had observed that it was very difficult to distinguish between a Croatian 
and a Serbian by their looks or habits, even for the parties themselves.  
 
The Serbs and Croats drive the same cars; they’ve probably worked in the same German 
factories as gastarbeiters; they long to build exactly the same type of Swiss chalets on 
the outskirts of town and raise the same vegetables in the same back gardens. 
Modernization – to use a big, ugly word – has drawn their styles of life together. They 
have probably more in common than their peasant grandparents did, especially since 
their grandparents were believers.(Ignatieff 1999: 95) 
 
Ignatieff ask a middle aged Serbian reservist in the command post to explain the 
difference between a Croat and a Serb. The soldier first gives a very simple answer, ‘They 
smoke Croatian cigarettes while we smoke Serbian ones’. Cigarettes, then, clearly serve the 
same function as symbolic boundary marker as on Cyprus. However, realizing that his answer 
is somewhat simplistic, the reservist gives another explanation: ‘Those Croats, they think 
they’re better than us. Think they’re fancy Europeans and everything. I’ll tell you something: 
We’re all just Balkan rubbish’.(Ignatieff 1999: 91-92) 
This answer makes the journalist ponder: Firstly, he concludes that identity is relational. 
A Serb defines himself in relation to Croats and vice versa. Secondly, Ignatieff observes that 
while globalism brings us closer together, it also drives us apart. It destroys boundaries of 
identities and frontiers between states, and ‘we react by insisting ever more assiduously on the 
margins of difference that remains... The facts of difference themselves are neutral. It is 
narcissism that turns difference into a mirror.’(Ignatieff 1999: 96) 
Ignatieff formulates the notion of NMD as a paradox: ‘the smaller the real differences 
between two groups, the larger such differences are likely to loom in their imagination.’ This, 
indeed, is what most people would normally understand with the phrase ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’. However, even as Ignatieff writes this sentence, he realizes that it is a claim that 
does not stand up to closer scrutiny, and hastens to add: ‘my use of terminology is suspect, 
dubious, question-begging – major difference/minor difference; objective versus subjective; 
real versus imagined; difference as perceived from within versus difference perceived from 
without.’ Ignatieff does not, however, in the shorter article discuss the limitations of his 
terminology, but those who consult his longer version, will find the discussion there.  
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Here, Ignatieff first tears apart the insight that identity is relational. To claim that 
differences are relational, he now concludes, is an empty tautology. It amounts to saying that 
we are not what we are not. Secondly, he attacks the crucial concept of minor-ness: ‘what 
looks like a minor difference when seen from the outside may feel like a major difference 
when seen from the inside’ (Ignatieff 1998: 50). And indeed, he observes, already Freud 
himself muddied the distinction between major and minor. As Ignatieff looks at the matter 
now, he believes that it is a mistake to assume that some human differences like gender or 
race are more major than others, for instance than class or ethnicity. Gender and racial 
differences are minor relative to the overwhelming genetic commonality of mankind, but are 
major when used as markers of power and status. In this perspective, power and status rather 
than culture are foregrounded. ‘No human difference matters much until it becomes a 
privilege.’ (ibid.)  
What remains, then, of Freud’s original notion? Ignatieff is not prepared to jettison it 
completely and insists that it helps us to see that ‘the level of hostility and intolerance 
between groups bears no relation to the size of their cultural, historical, or physical 
differences, as measured by a dispassionate outside observer.’ (ibid.) This may very well be 
correct, but it is neither what most people will associate with the notion of ‘narcissism of 
minor differences’ nor what Freud himself meant by it. 
As we saw, Anton Blok believed that NMD loses its heuristic potential if the distinction 
between minor and major differences is blurred. Ignatieff does not agree. He admits that 
NMD may not explain anything, it is not an explanatory theory. Still, it has ‘a certain heuristic 
usefulness’. Its virtue is that it does not take ethnic antagonism as a given. ‘It draws our 
attention to the projective and fantastic quality of ethnic identities, to their particular 
inauthenticity. It suggests that it is precisely their inauthenticity that triggers violent reactions 
of defense.’ (Ignatieff 1998: 56) It may be the case that Ignatieff reads as much into Freud’s 
idea as out of it. But what he reads into it, is often both well-formulated and thought-
provoking. 
 
A Conclusion and a suggestion for an alternative analytical 
framework  
This survey of the available literature on the ‘narcissism of minor differences’-concept 
has led us – or has led me at least– to lower the expectations for the utility of this idea. We 
have seen that many of the authors who try to make use of it, either are engulfed in inner 
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inconsistencies, or end up by pointing to factors other than NMD as just as important or even 
more important when they explain particular conflicts. Among such other factors we have 
encountered status anxiety, power relations, the political context, and economic competition. 
Anton Blok is probably wrong when he surmises that Freud failed to develop NMD into an 
elaborate theory because he did not realize its full potential. A much more likely explanation 
for the undeveloped state of this idea in Freud’s writings is that he recognized its strictly 
limited usefulness.  
The NMD-idea may be challenged on both philosophical, logical, and empirical 
grounds. Firstly, the very concept of ‘minor differences’ presupposes that a clearly defined 
hierarchy of differences made be agreed upon, with big ones on top, medium-sized 
differences in the middle, and small ones at the bottom. Clearly, this is not possible. As Paul 
Simon sings, ‘one man’s ceiling is another man’s floor.’ But even if we for the sake of the 
argument accept that such an hierarchy can be identified, we run into almost insurmountable 
difficulties if we should try to use it empirically. We would soon discover that whichever 
differences we decide are ‘most major’ or ‘most minor’, some massive violent conflicts 
exhibit many of them while the same differences are more or less absent in other equally 
serious conflicts. Rwanda is not the only example of genocide in Africa; European colonial 
powers have killed Africans just as ferociously as Hutus and Tutsis have attacked each other. 
The extermination of the aborigines in Australia and the Native Americans in the United 
States are also cases of genocides with ‘major’ differences between the groups (Mann 2005). 
Even if Huntington is wrong when he identifies fault lines between civilizations are 
particularly conflict-prone, we must nevertheless conclude that some serious conflicts do 
indeed unfold along those lines.  
Finally, when carried to its logical end point, the strong version of NMD that Ignatieff 
toys with and rejects but Blok seems to endorse, leads straight into sheer mysticism. If it were 
true that ‘the smaller the real differences between two groups, the larger such differences are 
likely to loom in their imagination’, then differences that are so small that no-one is able to 
detect them, would be the ones most likely to produce conflict. This theory would be a social 
science version of homeopathy, the quasi-medical theory according to which the power of a 
chemical ingredient increases the more it is diluted in pure water. While many people believe 
this to be the case, chemically and medically this is simply impossible. 
Where does this leave us? Firstly, we will have to go back to and examine all the other 
factors other than NMD that the various authors surveyed here employ as auxiliary 
explanations, as it were. This list includes all the usual suspects: status anxiety, power 
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relations, the political context, and economic competition. At the same time, like Ignatieff I 
am reluctant to abandon Freud’s idea completely. As we saw, the idea was elaborated in 
several stages, of which the treatment in Civilization and its Discontent was the last one. 
While Blok maintains that this book ‘adds little to what (Freud) already said’, I believe that 
precisely the formulation of the NMD-idea in this text contains some insights of lasting value. 
It is here that Freud most clearly formulates the idea that the sociological function of NMD is 
to boost in-group cohesion. Through it aggression is directed outward rather than inward. The 
notion of a common enemy without enhances the collective identity of the group. This crucial 
insight anticipates modern identity theory that sees the boundary between groups as the 
seedbed of identity formation.(see e.g. Barth 1969; Hylland Eriksen 1993) 
Behind the question of ‘what causes conflicts among groups?’ looms the larger question 
of ‘what causes groups to coalesce’? As Rogers Brubaker has pointed out, too much social 
science literature treats ethnic groups as objective givens, with clearly identifiable 
boundaries.(Brubaker, 2004) Instead, group-ness is a contested quality, and several 
conflicting group identities often compete for the allegiance of people who live in the same 
area. In Yugoslavia this was certainly the case: the notion of Yugoslav-ness existed not only 
in official rhetoric but was also reflected in the self-understanding of many of the citizens. 
The notion that the differences among the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians were minor compared 
to what they had in common was not only something outsiders told them, but something that 
many people in the region felt themselves. As Andrew Baruch Wachtel has remarked with 
particular reference to the Yugoslav conflicts, ‘No matter how similar a group of people 
appears to be on the surface, there is sure to be some level at which differences appears… 
Conversely, no matter how heterogeneous a group of people might appear to an observer, 
there is a level at which its members could choose to see each other as belonging to one 
nation. (Wachtel 1998: 2)  
This means that some conflicts are structured as clashes between two competing identity 
claims, one of which insists that certain cultural differences in a certain population are minor, 
while the other maintains that they are major. In  order to understand why some such conflicts 
turn violent while others do not we must not look for any objectively given differences but for 
differences in perceptions and how perceptions  are publicly represented. This means that we 
much turn our attention to public rhetoric and discourse.  
I surmise that neither a representation of  the other as inherently similar nor the opposite 
representation does of and by itself lead to violent conflicts, much depends on whether  the 
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(small or big) difference is understood and articulated as threatening or not. As a framework 
for analysis I will therefore suggest the following typology of representations of the Other: 
 
 Expected outcome 
 violent non-violent 
‘the difference is minor’ ‘they’ as ‘part of us’ in an 
organic sense as a limb. A 
parting of ways would be 
tantamount to an amputation 
‘they’ as ‘part of us’ in a 
social sense as a sibling. A 
parting of ways would be 
painful, but not threatening 
to our self-identity 
‘the difference is major’ ‘they’ as ‘outside of us’ in a 
threatening sense, an enemy 
that must be confronted.  
‘they’ as ‘outside of us’, but 
as a non-threatening and 
irrelevant stranger 
 
This typology will be  employed  in a research project on the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia which I coordinate (Spinning out of control 2006). 
 
 
The author would like to thank Nils Johan Lavik for valuable comments to a draft version of this 
article 
 15
 REFERENCES 
Ataöv, Türkkaya 1998. ‘Narcissism Of Minor Differences" Nurturing The "Clash Of 
Civilizations’, Paper presented at the International Roundtable "Civilizations - Conflict or 
Dialogue?" at the University of Innsbruck (Austria), 8 June 1998 
Barth, Fredrik 1969. Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture 
difference. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget 
Blok, Anton 1998. ‘The Narcissism of Minor Differences’, European Journal of Social 
Theory, 1(1):33-56 
Brubaker, Rogers 2004. Ethnicity Without Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press 
Burstein, Alvin G. 1999. Ethnic Violence and the Narcissism of Minor Differences, April 5, 
http://www2.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/aburstein/musings/svhepap.ht 
Charot, Daniel, 2002. ‘Introduction’ in Daniel Charot and Martin E. P. Seligman, eds, 
Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions. Washington 
D.C.: American Psychological Association: 3-26 
Horowitz, Asher and Richard K. Matthews 1997. ‘”Narcissism of minor differences”: What is 
at Issue and What is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question’, Polity, 30(1): 1-27 
Hylland Eriksen, Thomas, 
1993. Ετηνιχιτψ ανδ νατιοναλισμ: αντηροπολογιχαλ περσπεχτιϖεσ. Λονδον: Π
λυτο Πρεσσ 
Ignatieff  Michael 1998. The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, 
Henry Holt & co, New York  
 
Michael Ignatieff 1999. ’Nationalism and the narcissism of minor differences’ in Ronald 
Beiner, ed,. Theorizing Nationalism. State University of New York Press: 99-102 
 
 16
Freud, Sigmund (1917). 'The Taboo of Virginity', Standard Edition, Hogarth Press, London 
1953: 11: 191:208 
 
Freud, Sigmund (1921). 'Group psychology and the analysis of the ego', Standard Edition, 18 
Hogarth Press, London 1953: 18:67-144 
 
Freud, Sigmund 1930. 'Civilization and its Discontents’, Standard Edition, Hogarth Press, 
London 1953: 21: 191-208 
 
Gourevitch, Philip, 1998. We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our 
Families: Stories from Rwanda, New York: Picador 
 
Huntington, Samuel, ‘The Clash of Civilazations?’, xx 
 
Mann, Michael 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Spinning out of control 2006: Rhetoric and violent conflict. Representations of 'self' – 'other' 
in the Yugoslav successor states. 
http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/spinning/ 
 
St Louis, Brett 2005. ‘The difference sameness makes: Racial recognition and the “narcissism 
of minor differences”’, Ethnicities, 5(3): 343-364 
 
Volkan, Vamik D. 1986. ’The Narcissism of Minor Differences in the Psychological Gap 
Between Opposing Nations,’ Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 6:175-191 
 
Wachtel, Andrew Baruch 1998. Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural 
Politics in Yugoslavia. Stanford. Stanford University Press. 
 
Watts Michael J. 2001. 'Violent Geographies. speaking the unspeakable and the politics of 
space', City & Society, 13(1):85-117. 
  
 17
 18
Werman, David S. 1988. ‘Freud's “Narcissism of Minor Differences” A Review and 
Reassessment ’. Journal of American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 16:451-459 
Yagcioglu, Dimostenis 1996. 'The Role of Cultural Differences and Similarities in the Cyprus 
Conflict', 
http://www.Stwing.Upenn.Edu/~Durduran/Hamambocu/Authors/Knk/Knk6_13_2001.Ht
m 
